
K E Y I E AV 



McCLELLAN'S CAMPAIGNS, 



AS COMMANDER OF 



THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



BOSTON: 
PRESS OF THE DAILY COURIER, 

1863. 



tS^ 



RE VI EW 



McCLELLAN'S CAMPAIGNS, 



AS COJIMAXDEK OF 



THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



Lu.>^'lr tre 



or~p e^ 



BOSTON: 

PRESS OF THE DAILY COURIER 

1863. 






West. Kes. Hist. Boo. 



REVIEW. 



To THE Editor of the Boston Courier: 

The dismissal of Major-General George B. McClellau from the com- 
mand of the Army of the Potomac, on the seventh day of Xovember, 
1862, closed a very important chapter in the history of the present war. 

The future historian, only, will be enabled to gather up all the facts 
of this remarkable period ; but the logic of events — the brief, yet 
impressive lessons from experience — the testimony of General McClel- 
lan, recently given before the McDowell Court-Martial — the letters 
and orders made public in the investigation — the statement of Prince 
de Joinville, and evidences from various other sources, carefully exam- 
ined and compared, will throw much light upon matters which have not 
been fully understood by the people, and relieve many mistakes of 
judgment regarding the character, acts, and militaiy ability of the late 
Commander of the Army of the Potomac. The first period in this his- 
tory is the season of inactivity, as it has been called, covering 

THE FALL AND WINTER OF 1861 AND 1802. 

General McClellan, upon the recommendation of General Scott, was 
called by the President to the command of the Army of the Department 
of Washington, July 25th, 1861, four days after the battle of Bull 
Run ; and, upon the withdrawal of General Scott from active service on 
the first day of November, he was appointed Commander of the Armies 
of the United States. From the time he took command of the Army 
of the Department of Washington until March, no important movement 
was made by that portion of the army, which after his appointment, was 
designated the Army of the Potomac. During this period a movemen 
was inaugurated by the radical men of the country, sustained by lead 



ing papers, having for its object the diversion of the management of the 
army to party purposes, and in pursuance of it bills of emancipation 
and confiscation were pressed upon and passed by Congress, which were 
with hesitation afterwards signed by the President. General McClellan 
was known to be a man who would have no sympathy with such a move- 
ment, and it was determined by them that he should be displaced, if 
it could be effected without the real object of the movement being known 
to the loyal masses and the army. 

The suspension of movements during this period, with the prudent 
and studiously maintained silence of the Commanding General, gave 
them an opportunity to make considerable progress in their designs. 
The cry was started by them that he was " too slow" — that he was an 
excellent engineer, a good organizer, but not the man to lead the army 
or direct its movements in the field. This cry was responded to by a 
considerable portion of the people, who were impatient for success, and 
who, wanting in experience, then believed that it was only necessary 
that our men should be led against the enemy to insure victory and to 
put down the rebellion. 

The people are now able to see the error into which they were led, 
and to judge more correctly upon the conduct of the Commander-in- 
Chief during this period. 

When General McClellan assumed command of the Federal forces, 
the enemy were flushed with victory, and had a large and comparatively 
well disciplined army. The Federal army consisted mostly of three 
months' men, whose term of service was about to expire. The remain- 
der were two and three years' troops, which had been in the field but a 
very short period. Massachusetts had at the time but three three 
years' regiments in the field, and they had been in the service but a few 
weeks. 

The exigencies of the time were such that, during the months of 
August and September, fears were very generally entertained for the 
safety of the National Capital. By October, a sufficient number of 
troops had been furnished to relieve this apprehension, and by the first 
of December nearly all of the three years' troops had arrived at the seat 
of war. 

Up to this period, December 1st, no reasonable man deemed it pru- 
dent that any oftensive movement should be attempted. About this 
time, unmindful of past experience, the radical cry for an advance upon 



Eichmond was renewed with redoubled vigor. To this General McClel- 
lan did not respond. He placed the army in winter quarters, and made 
no advance movement for the three winter months. For this he was 
blamed. Partizans and party presses commenced upon him, and kept 
up a terrible fire. He was accused of slowness and incapacity, and 
even of cowardice and disloyalty. But he made no reply, and waited 
until in his judgment the time for active operations should arrive. 

Was this delay, during the three months of winter, necessary ? His- 
tory and our own experience, particularly at the Battle of Bull Run, 
prove the necessity of discipline in the troops to insure success. In- 
stances are frequent of regiments who have fought well, with but little 
discipline. But the general fact will be everywhere admitted that a 
large body of undisciplined men cannot be relied upon to properly 
co-operate, through the contingencies of a severe battle. They have 
not learned that subordination which is indispensable to be observed, 
that they may be trusted in the changes of circumstances and position 
which are liable to occur. Hence the danger of confusion and panic, 
and consequent defeat and disaster. 

The sad result of the previous summer left us in such a position that 
no offensive movement, without very strong probability of success, could 
be justified. General McClellan could not have been justified in incur- 
ring the risk incident to the advance of a large and undisciplined army 
against the enemy. Even if the enemy were under no better discipline, 
the uncertainty of the result would have been much too great. This 
General McClellan knew and felt, and he also knew that three months 
was the shortest time in which any troops could be drilled, to be made 
reliable. 

The winter also largely increased the difficulties and dangers of an 
advance movement. Beside the sickness and loss of men from exposure 
upon the march, without tents or other shelter, the roads are liable at 
any time to be in such a condition from rain and thaw as to be entirely 
impassable to artillery and supplies. No winter campaign can be car- 
ried on in such a climate as that of Virginia, without immense suffer- 
ings and danger. 

There were other and weightier reasons for delay. Having been so 
long on a peace footing, we were sadly deficient in artillery and other 
supplies for a large army, and it was also of the greatest importance 



6 

that the defences about Washington be perfected before an advance 
movement should be made. 

General llcClellan proceeded to the performance of the stupendous 
labor before him with a zeal and energy which knew no limit He 
organized and disciplined his army. Eveiy available foundry in the 
country was employed in casting ordnance, and he prepared and col- 
lected avast supply of the best artillery and material for his army 
The heights about Washington were covered with fortifications, that the 
Isationa Capital could be defended with a comparatively small force 
m the absence of the main portion of the army. He had quietly ma- 
tured his plans. The time for their execution was approaching The 
preliminary movements on the sea-coast and at the West had been made 
with triumphant success, and he was now prepared to strike the death- 
blow to armed rebellion, by a movement which the enemy little antici- 
pated. Much depended upon concealing his plans from the rebels It 
was important for him that they should continue to occupy Manassas 
and Centre^ulle m force, until be was ready to move. He knew their 
position and numbers, even of their « Quaker guns," Ion. before the 
evacuation. 

But the conspiracy that had been organized against him began to be 
telt. Its object was to strike him before victory in the field should 
place him beyond their reach. The prejudice created by his apparent 
inactivity, without explanation, favored the conspirators. In the graphic 
language of the Prince de Joinville, — 

which the President gave him, he could no longer stand up against the 
storm precipitated upon his head. A council of war of all the generals 
of divisions was held, and a plan of the campaign, which was not that 
of the Commander-in-Chief, was proposed and discussed. General 
McClellan had then to explain his projects, and the next day they were 
known to the enemy- informed, without doubt, by one of those thou- 
sands of female agents who did the work of espionage for him even in 
the most intimate places. The chief of the rebel army evacuated 
Manassas. His manoeuvre was skilful. Unable to assume the defen- 
sive ; menaced with attack either at Centreville, where his defence 
would serve for nothing, or at Richmond, the loss of which would be a 
great check ; unable besides to cover both of these positions at once he 



could do nothing better than fall back, with all his forces, upon Rich- 
mond. For the Army of the Potomac this evacuation was unfortunate. 
Its movement was unmasked before it was ready ; the transport vessels 
were not collected; even a part of them were still ice-bound in the 
Hudson. In that situation, should he persevere in executing as rapidly 
as possible the movement by water towards the Virginia peninsula, or 
should he rather march by land to Richmond ? Such was the grave 
decision which the young General of the Army of the Potomac, laid up 
sick in a miserable chamber of a deserted house in Fairfax, had to 
make within twenty-four hours." 

In addition to this General McClellan was deprived of his authority 
as Commander-in-Chief of the armies, and the Army of the Potomac 
was divided into four grand corps, each under the command of separate 
Generals, taken according to rank. General McClellan did not com- 
plain. He proceeded to the performance of his duty to his country 
under the new order of things. The condition of the roads at this 
season of the year, and the fact that all the bridges on the route had 
been destroyed by the rebel army in their retreat from Manassas, ren- 
dered a march by land difficult if not impossible, and a plan for a 

PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 

was determined upon. General McClellan immediately commenced upon 
the labors necessary for the movement. The proceedings of the authori- 
ties at Washington embarrassed him in his operations. His plans were 
fully divulged to the enemy, and they were making preparations to meet 
him on his proposed field of operations. In addition to this, there was 
an unexpected delay of some weeks in collecting and getting ready the 
transports. Thus delayed, he commenced the embarkation of his troops 
March 17th. 

This was the commencement of the movement of the Peninsula, upon 
the success of which so much depended to the country. For a proper 
understanding of the merits of this campaign, and the responsibility 
which attaches to General McClellan, it is necessary that his plans of 
the proposed movement should be considered. What his plans were 
there seems to be, upon the evidence, no contradiction. 

•General McClellan was to have under his control and disposal certain 
troops, including those under Generals Blenker, McDowell, and Wool, 
with the condition that he should leave sufficient force for the protection 



\ 



8 

of Washington, in the event of any attack being made upon it in the 
absence of the main portion of the Army of the Potomac. The force 
necessary for this purpose was variously estimated by different Generals 
The highest estimate was that of General McDowell, 50,000 General 
McClellan made his plans for the campaign, which were at the time 
fully known to the authorities at Washington, leaving some 70,000 men 
and one hundred and nine pieces of light artillery for the defence of 
Washington and its approaches. These numbers are not disputed It 
IS only claimed that a certain portion of these troops were so located as 
not to be immediately available in the event of a sudden attack upon 
Washington. Of this, more hereafter. It is only necessary for the 
present to state the facts as affecting General McClellan in determining 
upon his plans for the campaign. He deemed he had amply complied 
with the conditions relating to the protection of Washington ; and having 
done that, his plan was to embark with his entire remaining force, ex* 
cept that of General McDowell, for Fortress Monroe, and from thence 
proceed in the direction of Yorktown, as he subsequently did. His 
plan, further, was for the transports to return and take the corps of Gen- 
eral McDowell, as a unit, to Fortress Monroe. From thence. General 
McDowell was to proceed up the Severn and take Gloucester. This 
being accomplished, the gunboats could pass up York Eiver, and then 
he was to advance beyond in the direction of West Point. This was 
proposed to obviate the delays of a siege. For, with the forces of Gen- 
eral McDowell in the rear of the enemy, they would have been compelled 
to at once evacuate or run the risk of capture, their position bein- 
turned. No one now has reasonable doubts but that, if these plans had 
not been interfered with at Washington, they would have resulted 
successfully, and Richmond, probably, have been soon taken. 

But General McClellan was not permitted to carry out his plan. He 
was obliged, at the moment of embarkation, to consent to the retention 
of Blcnker's command at Washington, which, as the President states 
he did " reluctantly." Further, after he had arrived on the Peninsula,' 
and whilst the array was under fire before Yorktown, he was informed 
for the first time that General McDowell and corps, 35,000 strong, had 
been detained at Washington for another destination. The effect of this 
intelligence is stated by the Prince de Joinville : 

" The news was received by the army with astonishment, although the 
majority could not then foresee the deplorable consequences of an act 






9 

performed it must be supposed, with no evil intention, but with incon- 
ceivable recklessness. Fifteen days earlier this measure, although it 
would always have been injurious, would not have had so bad an effect ; 
for new arrangements might have been made. Now, it was the main- 
spring removed from a great work already begun. It deranged every- 
thing." 

About the same time he was notified that the forces at Fortress Monroe, 
under General Wool, were detached from his command. 

He afterwards received Franklin's Division, 11,000 men, but it was 
not a sufficient force with which to carry out his original plan. Not- 
withstanding these extraordinary proceedings. General McClellan deter- 
mined to do the best he could under the circumstances, and commenced, 
which was the only thing to be done, the siege of Yorktown. 

The main body of his forces arrived at Fortress Monroe, April 6th. 
The landing and placing of the batteries commenced April 1 1th, and by 
May 3d, in the short space of twenty-two days, the batteries, consisting 
of seventy-one heavy guns and mortars, were placed in position to open 
upon the enemy's works. In the night of May 3d and 4th, Yorktown was 
evacuated by the enemy. As soon as known, gunboats and a consider- 
able force in transports were sent to West Point, with a view to intercept 
the enemy on their retreat, and the remainder of the army was pushed 
forward in pursuit of the enemy, who were overtaken at Williamsburg, 
and the battle of that place was fought May 5th. Our forces were not 
sufficient to render the movement to West Point successful. From these 
points the army moved forward toward Eichmond, and arrived at White 
House May 16 th. 

Thus were concluded the events connected with the siege of York- 
town ; and, as a different state of facts influenced the subsequent 
movements on the Peninsula, it may be well to pause and examine into 
the reasons given by the President for his disastrous interference with 
the plans formed by General McClellan at Washington. 

The reason given by the President for his course, in which he was 
sustained by two Generals at Washington, one of whom, General Hitch- 
cock, has since shown the most unfriendly disposition toward General 
McClellan, was the fear that Washington was not left sufiiciently pro- 
tected. That the President may have been prevailed upon by deter- 
mined and artful conspirators against General McClellan to commit a 
grave error, the fatal effect of which he could not foresee, upon an honest 



10 



but exaggerated apprehension for the .safety of the National Capital is 
probable. But that his action in thus summarilj and recklessly inter- 
fering with important plans, upon which so much depended, can be 
upon the facts justified, seems hardly possible. 

The President knew, or had the means of knowing and ought to have 
known, before General McClellan embarked, the exact number and 
position of the troops to be left for the protection of the Capital If he 
had any doubts about their sufficiency then was the time for him to 
have expressed them, and to have heard the explanations of the Com- 
manding General, and, if necessary, to have modified the plans of the 
campaign. _ There was no excuse afterwards, except upon an unanti- 
cipated exigency, and none such is pretended to ha^e arisen. There is 
nothing to indicate that the President at that time had any doubts He 
extorted from General McClellan at the last moment the division of 
General Blenker, as he says under a "pressure," which General Mc- 
Cle an knew, not with any view that it was necessary for the protection 
of ^\ashington, but that with it and troops from another department 
he might organize the Mountain Department, to be commanded by 
Major-General Fremont. What the object or mission of that depart- 
ment was, or what was the object of the "pressure," no one outside of 
Washington and the reticent General McClellan, as yet understands 
One thing is certain, - that it was located with no view to the imme- 
diate protection of the Capital. 

In regard to the retention of General McDowell and his corps the 
President wrote General McClellan, April 9th, that he ascertained after 
he left that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field 
battery, were all that were designed to be left for the defence of Wa«h 
ington and Manassas Junction, &c. It is probable that the President 
received his information from the reports of Generals Hitchcock and 
Thomas of April 2d. That report shows that there were in the fortifi- 
cations under General Wadsworth, 20,-i77 men, of whom 19 0^2 were 
eflFective, and that General McClellan designed that 7,780 troops should 
beleftatWarrenton. 10,859 at Manassas, 1,350 on the Lower Poto- 
mac, and 35,4G7 under General Banks; but that several regiments 
designed for these localities had been removed. This made in all over 
70,000 men. The corps commanders under General McClellan had 
estimated 15,000 men as a sufficient number for the fortifications about 
Washington, and 25,000 as a sufficient covering force in front -in all 



11 

4:0,000 men. The report of the two Generals further states, that wheth- 
er General Banks's force "should be regarded as a part of the force 
available for the protection of the immediate front of "Washington, the 
undersigned express no opinion." They expressed no opinion, but it 
seems very probable if they entertained an opinion that it should not 
be so regarded, their modesty would not have prevented an expression 
of it. General Banks's force was certainly available to defend the ap- 
proaches to Washington ; and even without that force, there were nearly 
40,000 men of whose position for "the protection of the immediate 
front of Washington " they intimate no doubt, and this force would be 
increased by the new regiments as they should arrive at Washington. 
In addition, there was left for the protection of AVashington, as appears 
by the repoi'ts of Chiefs of Ordnance, 109 pieces of light artillery. 

The result to which any impartial and intelligent mind must arrive, 
upon a consideration of the facts that have been made public, is, that 
the total derangement of the plans of General McClellan for operating 
upon the Peninsula was occasioned by the unwarranted interference of 
the authorities at Washington, whose orders it was his duty to obey. 

The second chapter of the Peninsula Campaign embraces the time 
covered by his 

OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 

The corps of General McDowell, after it was detached from the com- 
mand of General McClellan, was sent forward in the direction of Fred- 
ericksburg to form a new department, to be designated the Department 
of the Kappahannock, and upon May 17th, the day after the arrival of 
General McClellan at White House, the Secretary of War sent let- 
ters to Generals McClellan and McDowell, with instructions in regard 
to their co-operating for the capture of Eichmond. 

The letter of instruction to General McClellan acknowledges that his 
dispatch to the President, asking for reinforcements, had been received 
and carefully considered. That in order to increase the strength of the 
attack upon Eichmond at the earliest moment. General McDowell had 
been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route, so to operate 
as to put his left wing in communication with General McClellan's 
right. He further writes : " Tou (General McClellan) are instructed io 
co-operate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, by 
extending your right wing to the north of Richmond" and further, that 



12 



General McDowell retains command of tte Department of the Rappa- 
hannock and forces with which he moves forward 

Accordingly, General McClellan advanced to Hanover Court House, 
where he engaged and defeated the enemy May 26th and immediately 
after took and held the place, which is north of Richmond, and on the 
direct line from that city to Fredericksburg. 

General McDowell's advance posts at that time were near Bowling 
Green, fifteen miles from Hanover Court House. They were m such a 
position that, in the language of the Prince de Jomville, "it was only 
necessary that it should be desired, and the two armies might form a 
iunction, in which case the possession of Richmond was assured 
' Z it was not permitted. On the 24th of May, General McDowell 
received a letter of instructions from the President, which, with the 
reply and rejoinder, is as follows : — 

" Washington, 3fay 24. 
" T^Iajor-Genekal McDowell, Fredericksburg : 

u General Fremont has been ordered by telegraph to move from Frankhn 
on pSdsonburg, to relieve General Banks, and capture or destroy Jackson s 

^"^n:it^:ucted, .y.^ as^e tbr the present ^^^0^-^;^^^ 

r;^;;nirr:r:^r^t:ro?t::M^r^^^^ 

yo" Ob ect w^^^^^^^^ to capture the forces of Jackson and E.ell, either in co- 
Iperat oTw tl General Fremont, or in case a want of supplies or transporta^ 
tiontte fires with his movement, it is believed that the force .vith which you 
Tvew 1 be sufficient to accomplish the object alone. The information thus 
Tc ivl here makes it probable that if the enemy operate actively a n.^^ 
Banks you will not be able to count upon much assistance from lin , but naj 
fven have to release him. Reports received this moment are that Banks is 
fighting with Ewell eight miles ^-m Wim^^ster. ^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^, 



"DePVKTMENT of the RAl'PAnANNOCK, 

<' May 24, 1862. 
"To E M. Stanton, Secretary of War: 

..The President's order has been received, and it is in process of execution. 

This is a crusliing blow to us. . 

^'"'' ^ (Signed) .-iHWiN McDowell, J/«> GV)i. 



13 



"War Department, 
" Washington-, May 2-t, 18G2. 
" To Major-General McDowell : 

" I am highly gratiticd by your ah\crity in obeying my orders. Tlie change 
was as painful to me as it can possibly be to you or any one else. Everything 
now dej)ends upon the celerity and vigor of your movement. 

(Signed) *' A. Lincoln." 



" Head-quarters Department of Rappahannock, 
" Opposite Fredericksburg, May 24, 1862. 

" To HIS Excellency the President : 

" I obey your order immediately, for it was positive and urgent ; and per- 
haps, as a subordinate, there I ought to stop ; but I trust I may be allowed to 
say something in relation to the subject, especially in view of your remark 
that everything now depends upon celerity and vigor of movement. 

" I beg to say that co-operation between General Eremont and myself to 
cut off" Jackson or Ewell is not to be counted upon, even if it is not a prac- 
tical impossibility. Next, that I am entirely beyond helping distance of Gen- 
eral Banks, and no celerity or vigor will avail so far as he is concerned. Next, 
that by a glance at the map will be seen that the line of retreat of the enemy's 
forces up the valley is shorter than mine to go against him. It will take a 
week or ten days for my force to get to the valley by this route, which will 
give it good forage, and by that time the enemy will have retreated. I shall 
gain nothing for you there, and shall lose much for you here. It is therefore 
not only on personal grounds that I have a heavy heart in the matter, but that 
I feel it throws us all l)ack, and from Richmond north we shall have all our 
large masses paralyzed, and shall have to repeat what we have just accom- 
plished. 

"I have ordered General Shields to commence a movement by to-morrow 
morning. A second division will follow in the afternoon. 

"Did I understand you aright that you wished me to accompany this 

expedition ? 

"Very respectfully, Iravin McDowell."' 



The President again played the General, and Eichmond, almost 
within our grasp, was lost. McDowell felt it was " a crushing blow," 
but he obeyed his instructions with "a heavy heart." If anything is 
needed to show the worse than folly of a man deficient in military 
knowledge undertaking to direct military movements, this instance 
affords the plainest and saddest proof. The President, with a dash of 
his pen, crushes the movement on Eichmond, by instructions which 



14 

General McDowell, as a man of military knowledge and experience, at 
once knew could not be successfully carried out. He saw that with his 
hand on the Confederate Capital, he must turn to other and what he 
knew must be, and what results proved to be, entirely fruitless missions. 
General McDowell turned his face from Richmond, marched up into the 
north of Virginia, and then marched back again, reproached by his 
troops and by the people ; but General McDowell was in no way respon- 
sible for the movement. His military reputation was under a dark 
cloud until the facts were shown before the court-martial. General 
McDowell there stated that in his opinion it was safe and proper for 
him to proceed to co-operate with General McClellan against Eichmond, 
and that he only yielded his purpose so to do in obedience to higher 
orders. General McClellan fully concurred in this opinion. These are 
the facts in regard to the movement on Eichmond, and no intelligent 
man can have a doubt where the responsibility for its failure belongs. 

General McClellan was then left to struggle alone in his further 
attempts against the Confederate Capital. On May 31st and June 1st, 
he fought the Battle of Fair Oaks, and then proceeded industriously to 
build bridges and roads on which to make his advance. Toward the 
latter part of June he had finished his preparations. In the mean 
time General Beauregard, with a considerable force, had reached Eich- 
mond from the West ; and, as General McClellan was about to recom- 
mence active operations, Jackson, defeating or eluding the different 
detached corps under Generals Banks, Shields, Fremont, and McDow- 
ell, in all nearly one hundred thousand men, was back again to Eich- 
mond, and his advance guards could be seen from Hanover Court 
House. Under these circumstances, General McClellan saw but one 
course for him to pursue. It was to retreat upon the James Eiver. 
This he effected, saving all his guns but one, and most of his supplies. 

The most hazardous and laborious portion of the labor on the retreat 
was performed by that gallant and patriotic soldier, Fitz-John Porter, 
to whom more than to any other man, excepting the Commander-in- 
Chief, is due the success of this movement. A grateful country will 
remember and appreciate his services. 

Secure in his position on the James Eiver, General McClellan asked 
for reinforcements, that he might renew the attempt on Eichmond, but 
the authorities at Washington could not or would not furnish what was 
required, and he was ordered to evacuate the Peninsula. This he did 



15 

successfully, and upon his arrival at Alexandria, was deposed from his 
command, and even refused the privilege of inspiring by his presence 
the troops, who were falling back under General Pope. 

Thus ended the campaign on the Peninsula, and the partizan conspir- 
ators were jubilant over the fact that they had, by the removal of Gen- 
eral McClellan, paved the way to a partizan control of the army. Their 
rejoicing was short. The disorganized forces under General Pope, flee- 
ing before the rebels, sought safety in the intrenchments about Wash- 
ington, which General McClellan' s prudence and skill had provided. 
The President, at the White House, trembled for the safety of the 
Capital, and it was evident that a portion of the rebel army contem- 
plated the invasion of Maryland and perhaps of Pennsylvania. An 
[emergency was upon him. The safety of the country absolutely re- 
quired the most decisive and vigorous action, and that the ablest Gen- 
eral should be placed in command of the troops. With this " pressure" 
lupon him, the President could not, did not hesitate. He called upon 
I General McClellan to take command of the army. Ever ready to serve 
[his country, in any capacity in which he might be needed, he nobly 
V3sponded to the call. With his staff, he visited the disheartened 
/T troops. His presence, and the announcement to the army that he was 
*' again to lead them to the field, at once aroused an enthusiasm which 
knew no bounds. As if by magic, confused masses of men formed into 
regiments and brigades, and within five days from the time he resumed 
command, he marched from Washington to Kockville, at the head of 
more than fifty thousand noble veterans, who made the air resound with 
plaudits for their noble chieftain. He commenced 

THE CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND. 

On the fourteenth day of September, seven days after leaving Wash- 
ington, he fought and nobly won the fierce battle of South ]\lountain, 
driving, after a determined fight, the enemy from their strongholds. 

Three days after, on September 17th, he fought the memorable battle 
of Antietam, against superior forces of the enemy, and defeated them 
after a terrible struggle. It was emphatically the great battle of the 
war. Unaided by gunboats, which had played an important part in 
most of our important battles — opposed by an enemy elated by pre- 
vious successes, and led by the most skilful rebel generals, he came out 
victorious. But it was a deadly struggle, and it left his army exhausted 



IS 

and much broken. A council of all the Generals was called in the 
evening. General McClellan knowing the anxiety of the Government 
and the people for complete success over the enemy, and satisfied that 
the army of the enemy were at least as exhausted and broken as his 
own, favored a renewal of the conflict in the morning. But every other 
General in the council was opposed to it, and he wisely yielded to their 
unanimous judgment. The next day was occupied in burying the dead. 
On the second day the enemy retreated into Virginia. Ten days after, 
September 29th, General McClellan crossed the Potomac. He ad- 
vanced in the direction of Culpepper, guarding the gaps in the moun- 
tains on his right as he proceeded. His army was not in a condition to 
engage the enemy. He needed important supplies, which were not for- 
warded, and be was pushed by the authorities at Washington to 
advance, and finally received " peremptory orders " to attack the enemy. 
General McClellan wrote the President, giving him an exact account 
of the condition of the army, saying, nevertheless, that if the Pres- 
ident should say he must go forward, he would. The reply was, 
that he could not be expected to effect impossibilities, Upon this 
he acted, until ready to move. At the earliest practicable moment he 
commenced his advance, and whilst the whole army was in motion 
against the enemy, with an expectation that within five days a decisive 
blow would be stnack, he, on the seventh of November, received notice 
of his dismissal and the appointment of General Burnside in his place. 
This closed the connection of General McClellan with the Army of the 
Potomac. 

RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION. 

No one can read the history of the campaigns of General McClellan, 
without being satisfied that the charges against him for slowness, hes- 
itation, and want of energy in his operations, are all untrue. 

His enemies admit that he is prudent, a superior engineer, and an excel- 
lent organizer of troops. These are three great qualifications for a Com- 
manding General. He exhibited these qualities in a most remarkable 
manner in his labors during the three winter months of 1861 and 1862. 
He decided upon all the plans for the varied operations of our difterent 
armies. He exhibited the greatest engineering skill in the location and 
erection of the splendid fortifications about Washington. In that brief 
period he organized and disciplined the noble army of the Potomac, so 



17 

that in the spring it was prepared to take the field with the effectiveness 
of veteran troops. He prepared an ample supply of the best artillery, 
which in more than one instance was the salvation of the army. He 
prepared and collected vast amounts of munitions and supplies, and in 
the mean time, by his intercourse with his army and the exhibition to 
them of his great qualities he gained their confidence, which is of the 
utmost importance for success, particularly with an American army. 

When the hour for active movements in the field had come, he ex- 
hibited an energy and decision never surpassed. Although his plans 
were thwarted, and he was obliged to change his entire system*of oper- 
ations, he, in the short space of twenty-two days, perfected his works, and 
placed his heavy guns in position for the siege of Yorktown. Upon its 
evacuation he pursued the enemy with the utmost vigor, defeating them 
at Williamsburg and West Point. The same month he fought the bat- 
tles of Hanover Court House and Fair Oaks. 

Upon receiving intelligence that he was not to be supported by 
General McDowell, as before promised, he proceeded to make most 
laborious preparations for an advance on the Confederate Capital with 
the troops under his immediate command. Before he had finished the 
necessary preparations the forces of the enemy were so greatly increased 
that it was necessary for him to fall back on the James River. He 
undertook this movement in the face of the enemy, who were vastly 
superior in numbers, and exhibited in the memorable seven days' fights 
the most consummate energy and military skill. In every battle on the 
Peninsula he showed all the qualities of a great and prudent General. 
The great object of his mission was not accomplished, but the blame 
does not rest on him. 

If his original plan had not been interfered with Eichmond would 
inevitably have fallen, and if McDowell had afterwards been permitted 
to co-operate with him from Fredericksburg, as promised, no one now 
doubts what would have been the result. When again he was called to 
the command of the army, after its defeat under General Pope, he 
proved, in the most wonderful degree, his transcendent abilities. He 
took command of a discomfited and demoralized army. Within fifteen 
days from the date of his appointment he led that army against the 
rebel host, before which they had so recently fled, and fought and won 
two great battles. It would seem that this should forever after have 
silenced the enemy in his rear. But this was not the result. Radical- 
2 



18 

ism was triumphant. During the past few months it had made gigantic 
strides to power. It had at last taken the President an unwilling cap- 
tive. Its batteries were no longer masked. It reared its hydra head 
at noonday. General McClellan was in the way of its progress, and he 
must be struck down, no matter what the cost. The standard of party 
was raised a,bove the banner of the country. The Administration, 
which could not, to insure the capture of Eichmond, furnish General 
McClellan thirty-five thousand additional troops, could raise a new 
army q^ six hundred thousand men for the new order of things. The 
object of the conspirators was being accomplished. The war had been 
protracted, and they had obtained their proclamation for emancipation. 
Secresy was no longer necessary. Senator Chandler and others struck 
the key-note in Congress, and Senator Trumbull, of Illinois, expressed 
their purposes in a speech in Michigan, in October, in which he said to 
the people : 

" I thank God that the Federal arms were defeated at Bull Eun, and 
on the Peninsula, and under Pope, for without such defeats we should 
not have had the emancipation proclamation. Had we won at Bull 
Eun, or taken Eichmond, the backbone of the rebellion would have been 
broken, and the Union would have been restored with slavery remain- 
ing in it." 

GENERAL McCLELLAN'S ORDER OF AUGUST NINTH. 

There are few productions of the last two years which exhibit a more 

thorough knowledge of the principle which should govern not only the 

army but the government and the people in the conduct of the present 

war, than the subjoined order of Gen. McClellan of August 9. It is 

equally worthy the pen of a profound statesman and of a commander of 

armies. 

" General Orders — No. 154. 

" Head-quarters of the Army of the Potomac, 

" Camp near Harrisons Landing, Va., August 9, 1862. 

" The Major-General Commanding directs the attention of the officers 
and soldiers of the Army of the Potomac to the following executive order 
of the President, which has been officially published : — 

* War Department, Washington, July 22, 1862. 
' First. Ordered : That military commanders within the States of Virginia, 
South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, 



19 

and Arkansas, in an orderly manner seize and use any property, real and per- 
sonal, which may he necessary or convenient for their several commands for 
supplies, or for other military purposes ; and that, while property may be de- 
stroyed for proper military objects, none shall be destroyed in wantonness and 
malice. 

* Second. That military and naval commanders shall employ as laborers, 
within and from said States, so many persons of African descent as can be 
advantageously used for military or naval pnrposes, giving them reasonable 
wages for their labor. 

' Third. That as to both property and persons of African descent, accounts 
shall be kept sufficiently accurate and in detail, to show quantities and 
amounts, and from whom both property and such persons shall have come, 
as a basis upon which compensation shall be made in proper cases ; and 
the several departments of this government shall attend to and perform their 
appropriate parts towards the execution of these orders. 
' By order of the President. 

' Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.' 

" No official copy of this order has been received at these head-quar- 
ters, and the General Commanding has, for this reason, delayed the 
issuing of a general order to carry into effect the views and directions of 
the President. Some recent occurrences in this army have, however, 
shown that it has become necessary to do so, to prevent this executive 
order being made a pretext for military license. 

" The order of the President accords so substantially with the course 
uniformly pursued by this army on this peninsula, under the orders and 
instructions of the General Commanding, that no material change in any 
respect is required thereby in its conduct and government. 

" Personal property necessary or convenient for supplies or other mili- 
tary purposes of this army will be, as heretofore, seized and used by the 
proper quarter-master or subsistence officers, upon the orders of com- 
manders of army corps ; or, in case of troops employed on detached 
service, where army corps commanders are not accessible, by order of 
the officer in command of such detached force. 

" In all cases the officers thus making the seizures shall take an account 
showing the kind and quantities of property seized, and by whose com- 
mand ; the amounts of its estimated value, and the names of the persons 
from whom the same shall have come. Whenever circumstances admit 
of so doing, receipts will be given to the owners or their agents, specify- 
ing simply the particulars above mentioned. Copies of all such accounts 



20 

and receipts will be transmitted in the usual manner, by the officers 
making them, to these head-quarters. 

"All officers and soldiers of tJds army are enjoined and ordered to 
abstain from all seizures of private property, except in the mode above pre- 
scribed ; all other appropriations loill be regarded and punished as pil- 
lage. The idea that private property may he plundered with impunity 
is, perhaps, the very worst that can pervade an army. Marauding 
degrades as men and demoralizes as soldiers all who engage in it, and 
returns them to their homes unfitted for the pursuits of honest industry. 
This army is composed mostly of young men, and the General Command- 
ing, to whose care they are entrusted, owes it to the parents who have sent 
their sons, and to the communities who have sent the flower of their youth 
into the military service of their country, to warn and restrain them from 
an evil so pernicious. 

" The order of the President requires the application of a similar rule 
in the use of real property. This, however, does not apply to such uses 
as are inseparable from military operations — to wit, marches, camps, 
pasturage, hospitals, depots, quarters, and damages occasioned by ac- 
tive hostilities; but no use should be made or injury done to real 
property beyond what is actually necessary or convenient for military 
purposes. 

" The destruction of any species of property in wantonness or malice 
is expressly prohibited by the President's order, as well as by the Arti- 
cles of War and the usages of all civilized nations. All commanding 
officers are earnestly enjoined to exercise the utmost vigilance on this 
subject. Straggling and trespassing are the invariable indications of a 
tendency to this description of crime. 

" Inhabitants, especially women and children, remaining peaceably at 
their homes, must not be molested ; and wherever commanding officers 
find families peculiarly exposed in their persons or property to maraud- 
ing from this army, they will as heretofore, so far as they can do so 
with safety and without detriment to the service, post guards for their 
protection. 

" In protecting private property, no reference is intended to persons 
held to service or labor by reason of African descent. Such persons will 
be regarded by this army as they heretofore have been, as occupying simply 
a peculiar kgal status under state laws, which condition the military 
authorities of the United States are not required to i-egard ut all in dis- 



21 

tricts tohere military operations are made necessary by the rebellious action 
of the state governments. 

"Persons subject to suspicion of hostile purposes, residing or being 
near our forces, will be, as heretofore, subject to arrest and detention, 
until the cause of necessity is removed. All such arrested parties will 
be sent, as usual, to the Provost Marshal General, with a statement of 
the facts in each case. 

" The General Commanding takes this occasion to remind the officers 
and soldiers of this army that we are engaged in supporting the Constitu- 
tion and Laws of the United States, and in suppressing rebellion against 
their authority ; that loe are not engaged in a war of rapine, revenge, or 
subjugation; that this is not a contest against popidations, but against 
armed forces and political organizations ; that it is a struggle carried on 
within the United States, and shoidd be conducted by us upon the highest 
principles hnoxvn to Christian civilization. 

" Since this army commenced active operations, persons of African 
descent, including those held to service or labor under state laws, have 
always been received, protected, and employed as laborers, at wages. 
Hereafter it shall be the duty of the Provost Marshal General to cause 
lists to be made of all persons of African descent, employed in the army 
as laborers for military purposes, such lists being made sufficiently 
accurate* and in detail, to show from whom such persons shall have 
come. 

" Persons so subject and so employed have always understood that 
after being received into the military service of the United States, in 
any capacity, they could never be reclaimed by their former holders. 
Except upon such understanding on their part the order of the Presi- 
dent, as to this class of persons, would be inoperative. The General 
Commanding therefore feels authorized to declare to all such employees, 
that they will receive permanent military protection against any compul- 
sory return to a condition of servitude. 

" By command of Major-General McClellan. 

" S. Williams, Assistant AdJ?ttant- General." 



013 706 615 4 



